kaal:claim:2267560-035

The learning process in incomplete contract theory can be improved because experimentation with different rules, rule revision, and additional rulemaking create significant transaction costs, and postponing rulemaking until sufficient information is available may not always be possible or desirable.

Experimentation with different rules, rule revision, and additional rulemaking create significant transaction costs8 and postponing rulemaking until sufficient information is available may not always be possible or desirable.

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013), IV.1 Optimizing the Learning Process, p. 11
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

failuresupport: arguedfailure: cost and infeasibility of postponed rulemakingfamily: rule-obsolescence-and-ossificationeconomics

• restated_by kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-007 A core tenet of incomplete contract theory, that rulemakers should act only when sufficient information become...
• extended_by kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-009 Experimentation with different rules under the current framework of stable rulemaking carries substantial cost...

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