kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-007

A core tenet of incomplete contract theory, that rulemakers should act only when sufficient information becomes available, is often politically, economically, and practically undesirable or impossible.

a core tenet of incomplete contract theory – rulemakers should act when sufficient information becomes available – is often political- ly, economically, and practically undesirable or impossible

Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014), II.1 Learning Process to Improve Regulatory Information, p. 10
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Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

failuresupport: arguedfailure: waiting for sufficient information is not feasiblefamily: regulatory-lagdynamic-regulationeconomics

• restates kaal:claim:2267560-035 The learning process in incomplete contract theory can be improved because experimentation with different rule...
• extends kaal:claim:2267560-047 The broad scope for contractual incompleteness and delayed decision-making stipulated by the incomplete contra...

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