kaal:claim:2267560-036

Rules, especially in financial regulation, are mostly enacted when it is politically opportune rather than when appropriate information for rulemaking is available.

Source quote, verbatim
Financial crises throughout history (Rheinhart and Rogoff 2011) have demonstrated that rules are mostly enacted, especially in the context of financial regulation, when it is politically opportune (Coffee 2012), not when appropriate information for rulemaking is available.
From

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013), IV.1 Optimizing the Learning Process, p. 11
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

Holds when
Classification

empiricalsupport: evidencedfailure: politically timed rather than information timed rulemakingfamily: regulatory-lagdynamic-regulation

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