kaal:claim:2267560-047

The broad scope for contractual incompleteness and delayed decision-making stipulated by the incomplete contract model are necessary only if the feedback effect did not produce sufficient information for rulemaking.

Source quote, verbatim

The broad scope for contractual incompleteness and delayed decision- making as stipulated by the incomplete contract model are necessary only if the feedback effect did not produce sufficient information for rulemaking.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013), IV.2 Organizational Culture, p. 12
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

Holds when

feedback effect fails to produce sufficient information

Classification

conditionsupport: arguedinstitutional-designdynamic-regulation

Related claims

extended_by kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-007 A core tenet of incomplete contract theory, that rulemakers should act only when sufficient information become...

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