kaal:claim:2273857-022

During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinterested latent groups, which temporarily overcomes the predominance of special interest groups in rulemaking.

During and after crises, however, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing the otherwise disinterested latent groups to temporarily overcome the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process.

Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013), II. The Political Economy of Financial Regulation, p. 12
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

• during and immediately after a crisis

mechanismsupport: evidencedinnovationinstitutional-designeconomics

• restates kaal:claim:2267560-038 During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinter...
• extended_by kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-004 Dynamic elements function as an economizing device: they address the scarcity of regulatory resources and lowe...

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