kaal:claim:2470008-013

The absence of financial market repercussions from the Amaranth failure suggests that indirect regulation of private funds, achieved by having regulators press banks to limit leverage extended to their fund clients, worked.

Source quote, verbatim

The lack of financial market repercussion after the Amaranth failure seems to suggest that this approach was successful.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014), II. Systemic Risk of Private Funds
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008

Holds when

post LTCM supervisory practice of monitoring fund clients through bank leverage limits
the Amaranth failure in 2006

Classification

mechanismsupport: arguedprivate-funds

Related claims

extended_by kaal:claim:2714974-031 Banks are uniquely positioned to discipline hedge fund behavior because their role as lenders, market makers, ...

Verify

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Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/f9942ed77885c937...json
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