kaal:claim:2486570-023

Because the board changes mandated by non and deferred prosecution agreements consist largely of additional reporting obligations and committee reform rather than removal of officers or directors, those reforms alone may not create sufficient incentives for boards and management to improve governance and avoid execution of an agreement.

These reforms alone may not create sufficient incentives for boards and management to improve governance and avoid N/DPA execution.

Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014), VI.B. IMPLICATIONS FOR BOARDS, MANAGEMENT, AND LEGAL COUNSEL, p. 55
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570

failuresupport: arguedfailure: insufficient-board-incentivesfamily: board-and-oversight-failurecorporate-governancerisk-and-incentivesgovernance-design

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