kaal:claim:2922176-007

Reforms that increase executive accountability to shareholders and increase shareholder control over executives do not solve the problem of corporate short-term focus.

Source quote, verbatim

Increasing the accountability of corporate executives to shareholders and increasing shareholder control over executives does not address the problem of short-term focus.

From

Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017), III. Corporate Governance Reform, p. 13
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176 · source PDF

Cite as

Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176

Holds when

post-2000 shareholder-empowerment reforms

Classification

failuresupport: arguedfailure: shareholder empowerment misfirefamily: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunismrisk-and-incentivescorporate-governancegovernance-design

Related claims

supported_by kaal:claim:3808859-003 Firms that fare worst under disruptive innovation share a myopic short-term focus on shareholder value maximiz...

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