kaal:claim:2992962-035

The economic incentive for Aragon judges to follow the more popular vote, since judges keep their bond only if they voted with the majority, calls into question whether the mechanism delivers effective, non arbitrary, and fair dispute resolution.

the economic incentives for judges to follow a more popular vote (in the Aragon system judges keep their bond if they voted with the majority), despite the overall anonymity of the voting, may call required notions of effective, non- arbitrary, and fair dispute resolution mechanisms into question.

Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017), 3. Limitations of Existing Solutions, p. 53
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962

• the Aragon bond and majority reward mechanism, despite anonymous voting

failuresupport: arguedfailure: majority-reward-incentive-distortionfamily: staking-and-incentive-misalignmentrisk-and-incentivesgovernance-designsystemic-risklaw-and-legal-systems

• supported_by kaal:claim:3782201-026 Aragon's refusal to use its own protocol to arbitrate an internal dispute is testimony to the lack of trust it...

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