kaal:claim:2998097-017

The industry largely absorbed the increased expenses of the Dodd-Frank Act by increasing the use of pass-through expense terms in adviser and fund arrangements, which is why advisers increasingly attributed earnings effects to opportunity costs rather than to expenses between 2012 and 2015.

This was consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that the industry largely absorbed the increased expenses associated with the Dodd-Frank Act through the increasing use of pass-through expense terms when structuring investment adviser and private fund relationships between 2012 and 2015.128

Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017), IV.1.d Dodd-Frank Act Comparative Evidence 2012 and 2015, p. 31
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097

• 2012 to 2015
• investment adviser and private fund contractual relationships

mechanismsupport: arguedcomplianceeconomics

• extends kaal:claim:2739479-033 Although Dodd-Frank compliance costs fall primarily on the investment adviser rather than the fund, advisers h...
• extends kaal:claim:2732915-038 The long-term effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private investment fund industry is likely to be characteriz...
• extends kaal:claim:2739479-035 Among advisers who saw an earnings effect, the attributed cause shifted from direct expense to opportunity cos...

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