kaal:claim:3125822-017

The author concedes an arbitrage attack is feasible when experts fail to police their expertise and a significant share of the technically fungible tokens is offered on an exchange, since a malicious actor can then buy 51 percent of the tokens, vote against common sense, and sell before the tokens lose value.

Source quote, verbatim

However, it is feasible that an arbitrage opportunity could evolve if the experts do not police their expertise. If a significant percentage of the (technically fungible) tokens were put on sale in a token exchange, a malicious actor would have the opportunity to 1) buy 51% of tokens

From

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018), 4.1.3 The 51% attack, p. 14
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822 · source PDF

Cite as

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822

Holds when

requires expert policing to be absent
requires a liquid exchange holding a large share of tokens

Classification

failuresupport: arguedfailure: buy vote and dump arbitragefamily: plutocratic-captureconsensus-and-securitytokenomics

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