kaal:claim:3125822-020

Even a successful takeover yields the attacker only a fraction of one transaction's fee before the expertise tag topples, so as long as any single fee is smaller than the total reputation there is no incentive to game the system for fees.

Source quote, verbatim

The malicious group would merely gain the (fraction) of the fee from one transaction. As long as any single fee is smaller than the total reputation, there is no incentive to game the system for fees.

From

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018), 4.1.4 Reputation calculation, p. 17
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822 · source PDF

Cite as

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822

Holds when

holds while single fees remain small relative to total reputation

Classification

conditionsupport: arguedconsensus-and-securityeconomicsrisk-and-incentives

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