kaal:claim:3125822-022

If good faith experts counter invest at least as fast as the malicious group, that is at a constant fraction c greater than or equal to one of the malicious investment, the malicious group can never gain more than 50 percent of the power.

assume the good-faith experts invest some constant fraction c of the malicious groups' investment ∆x at each time. If c ≥ 1then the malicious group will never gain more than 50% power.

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018), 4.1.4 Reputation calculation, p. 17
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822 · source PDF

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822

• requires that good faith experts respond to incoming malicious fees
• requires a time delay in resolving betting pools

conditionsupport: arguedconsensus-and-security

• supported_by kaal:claim:3125827-037 Under the worst case model with no admission safeguards and no other users paying fees, a malicious group must...

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