kaal:claim:3125822-034

A proof of stake lottery on this architecture is vulnerable because the seed of the pseudorandom generator that names the next block author is partly controlled by the current block author, which lets an attacker capture all block creation by routing authorship to their own Sybil accounts; the proposed remedy is to derive the seed from a hash of the previous block's validation information.

Source quote, verbatim
The seed for the generator that determines the next block author is partially controlled by the current block author, which opens the possibility of gaming the system by controlling all block creation by sending authorship to your own Sybil accounts.
From

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018), 7.4.1 Example: Proof of stake, p. 34
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822 · source PDF

Cite as

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822

Holds when
Classification

failuresupport: arguedfailure: block author seed capturefamily: consensus-and-protocol-attackconsensus-and-security

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