failure family

consensus and protocol attack

28 claims across 16 works.

• birthday problem vote equivocation: The hidden voting scheme depends on the choice of symmetric encryption protocol: a poorly chosen protocol exposes the platform to a birthday problem a
• block author seed capture: A proof of stake lottery on this architecture is vulnerable because the seed of the pseudorandom generator that names the next block author is partly
• fair exchange impossibility: Under certain restrictive assumptions it has been proven that no protocol can guarantee fair exchange with decentralized arbiters, so no design on thi
• majority collusion: If 51 percent of users collude to enrich themselves maliciously, nothing in the design can prevent them; the only check is the openness of the system,
• fixed-protocol-gaming: No single, fixed, entirely algorithmic policing solution can completely prevent independent nodes in a distributed system from gaming block production
• long-range-attack: The long range attack is a fundamental problem every proof of stake protocol must address: because no energetic outlay is required to build blocks, a
• undetectable-censorship: In a distributed system, which cannot achieve constant perfect communication between nodes, it is never possible to determine with certainty that a bl
• finite-validation-window-forks: Forcing validation pools to close in finite time, which practical demand for swift resolution requires, opens the possibility of network partition and
• self-referential-destabilization: Running the reputation platform on the very blockchain it validates destabilizes the system because it increases the likelihood of forks: every valida
• Untested security-by-design claim: The claim that blockchain is secure by design cannot yet be relied on, because the technology has not been adopted widely enough to be severely tested
• fork-induced-double-spend: Hard forks can reintroduce the double spend problem, because wallets, merchants, and users running the previous code deem the new code invalid and can
• 51 percent control attack: The double spending problem has not been eradicated in theory: a group or syndicate obtaining 51 percent control of a network could reverse transactio
• patient-powerful-player-subversion: The Folk Theorems of game theory imply that no matter how complicated a stable coin protocol becomes, a powerful and patient player has strategies to
• fork induced double spend: Bifurcation of nodes in a decentralized network through forking can cause significant economic loss, errors, confusion and bugs, including reemergence
• attack-surface-expansion: Across all the alternative polling methods explored in the literature, changes both help and hurt: new approaches solve old problems while creating ne
• false-security-proof: Marketing a consensus algorithm as correct by construction is false advertising, because such proofs establish resistance only to the attacks the theo
• no-flawless-consensus: The authors hold that the Bitcoin proof of work algorithm is ultimately flawed, that every consensus algorithm is flawed, and that it is not possible
• pseudorandom-selection-hijack: Proof of stake carries an unresolved failure mode: if anyone devises a clever algorithm for hijacking the block producer selection process, the networ
• Fork Induced Double Spend Reemergence: Forking bifurcates network nodes and can reintroduce the double spend problem the network had already solved, because users running pre fork code trea
• charity-dao-attack-exposure: Attack resistance across the studied DAOs averages 4.05 out of 10, and Charity DAOs perform worst in this category, with the best of them, VitaDAO, sc
• unresolved DAO attack vectors: Until the known attack vectors on decentralized autonomous organizations are solved, DAO based AI governance solutions remain suboptimal; these includ
• cryptographic-obsolescence: Quantum algorithms such as Shor's algorithm can factor large prime numbers exponentially faster than classical computers, which potentially renders cu
• classical-cryptography-obsolescence: Current cryptographic systems such as RSA rest on the classical difficulty of factoring large primes, so quantum algorithms like Shor's algorithm, whi
• weak-randomness-in-key-generation: ECDSA introduces a vulnerability into SPoS through its dependence on secure random number generation at key creation, so the authentication guarantee
• predictable-producer-selection: Verifiable randomness is a necessary condition for fair block producer selection: without it, adversaries can precompute favorable outcomes and the se
• validator-collusion: Collusion, meaning coordinated action among validators to manipulate reputation scores or governance outcomes, threatens the fairness and integrity of
• blockchain-security-overconfidence: Integrating AI with blockchain does not by itself eliminate security exposure: cyberattacks and privacy breaches remain possible absent rigorous monit
• training-set-blindness: Anomaly detection and behavioral analysis models trained on agent data may replicate the biases in that data and fail to detect novel deviations absen