kaal:claim:3125822-041

If 51 percent of users collude to enrich themselves maliciously, nothing in the design can prevent them; the only check is the openness of the system, which would quickly detect such an attack.

Source quote, verbatim

If 51% of users collude to maliciously enrich themselves, nothing can prevent them, except the open system itself, which would quickly detect such an attack.

From

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018), 8.2 Accumulation of reputational power, p. 38
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822 · source PDF

Cite as

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822

Holds when

requires a colluding majority of reputation weighted users

Classification

failuresupport: assertedfailure: majority collusionfamily: consensus-and-protocol-attackconsensus-and-securitydisclosure

Verify

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Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/4f73273334dc5d14...json
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