kaal:claim:3125827-007

Because at least half of the sem tokens minted when a user buys in with a fee are shared with the community that polices the application, the ability to purchase tokens does not open a profitable 51% attack; the authors claim a mathematical proof that this feature alone eliminates the incentive.

at least half of the tokens minted are shared with the community who polices the application. We provide a mathematical proof that shows this alone completely eliminates all incentives to perform the 51% attack in Appendix A.1.

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018), 1 Overview, p. 5
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827 · source PDF

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827

• token purchase mints tokens split with the existing community
• proof holds under the worst case assumptions of Appendix A.1

mechanismsupport: evidencedconsensus-and-securitytokenomics

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