kaal:claim:3125827-009

Even though proof of stake mitigates the economy of scale advantage, block production cartels can still arise in PoS systems through lotteries, through built in voting delegations, or because the stakes required to be a block producer can simply be bought.

However, block production cartels may still arise due to lotteries, or the fact that voting delegations are built into the system, or the fact that the stakes needed to be a block producer may be bought

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018), 2.2 Soft attacks, p. 8
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827 · source PDF

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827

• PoS systems that use lotteries, delegation, or purchasable stakes

failuresupport: arguedfailure: pos-cartel-formationfamily: recentralization-driftconsensus-and-securitygovernance-designdecentralization

• extended_by kaal:claim:4796714-014 Proof of Stake consensus centralizes control in proportion to the quantity of tokens held, so governance built...
• extended_by kaal:claim:3266953-020 The fungibility of the staked currency is the main point of attack against proof of stake and leads inevitably...
• extended_by kaal:claim:5225296-008 SPoS avoids the delegate centralization of DPoS, where block production concentrates among a small elected set...

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