Kaal claims by topic: decentralization

636 atomic, individually citable claims from the published work of Wulf A. Kaal tagged decentralization.

In a dynamic framework rulemaking ceases to be a merely reactive process driven by the collective action problem, and instead increasingly uses institution specific and decentralized information that both reflects preceding events and anticipates future contingencies. 2013
Financial rulemaking often relies on centralized rather than decentralized information, which is a further defect of the existing framework. 2013
The institution specific and decentralized information generated by deferred prosecution agreements allows regulators to better understand shortcomings in a particular market segment or industry, so that rulemaking can be more narrowly tailored. 2013
Rules can be adaptable only if the institutions and rulemaking processes that produce them integrate dynamic elements that generate timely, relevant, and decentralized information for rulemaking. 2013
The centralized planning of the holistic social engineer forces him to fall back on piecemeal improvisation and to engage in unintended actions, producing the phenomenon of unplanned planning. 2013
Under dynamic regulation a presumption of reform feasibility is unnecessary because the feedback effect makes ad-hoc decisions obsolete, curtailing centralized planning and minimizing unintended actions. 2013
Public rulemakers rely on stable and presumptively optimal rules because they lack necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution-specific information. 2013
Private rulemakers can work with and utilize decentralized information continuously, which enables them to react in a timely fashion to emerging, decentralized, and institution-specific information, while public rulemakers are limited in the information they can obtain. 2013
Information exchange between agents of public rulemakers, such as regulators, will not necessarily involve decentralized information, unlike feedback effects between private and public rulemakers. 2013
Dynamic regulation is a supplemental regulatory tool, not a replacement for existing rulemaking: it increases the availability of relevant, institution specific, and decentralized information for rulemaking through feedback effects. 2014
Private rulemakers hold a comparative informational advantage over public rulemakers because they can produce and react to necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution specific information that public rulemakers cannot readily obtain. 2014
Entity specific rulemaking via governmental contracts rests on a higher overall level of relevant and decentralized information than ordinary rulemaking, because the regulatory action follows an entity specific investigation of wrongdoing. 2014
Department of Justice investigations of particular corporate wrongdoers generate highly relevant, decentralized, and institution specific information that is usable for rulemaking. 2014
Deferred prosecution agreements produce relevant, real time, decentralized, high quality information for regulation in most industries and are used as a preferred alternative to litigation by both prosecutors and corporations. 2016
The pace of innovation is incompatible with existing regulatory approaches that demand comprehensive knowledge as a precondition for regulatory action, because innovation is too decentralized, too fast, and too pervasive. 2016
Anticipatory rulemaking in the dynamic framework is accomplished by combining institution specific, decentralized, and timely information with feedback effects, which can occur between public and private rulemakers, between outcomes and institutions, across jurisdictions, and between rules and rulemaking processes. 2016
Private rulemakers hold a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because they often can produce and access necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution specific information for rulemaking and can react more readily to emerging information. 2016
Dynamic regulation is defined as conceptualizing regulatory phenomena in relation to both preceding and succeeding events, using institution-specific and decentralized information to generate feedback effects that support anticipatory rulemaking. 2016
Stable and presumptively optimal rules are created to address regulatory issues that lawmakers perceive through centralized information under then-existing economic and market conditions, and are drafted as permanent solutions to those perceived issues. 2016
Unrestricted exchange of information between public and private rulemakers creates regulatory synergies that increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking and thereby generate feedback effects. 2016
Venture capitalists' finance allocation and their implicit assessment of innovative products, businesses, and initiatives generate highly relevant institution-specific and industry-specific decentralized information on innovation trends. 2016
Dynamic regulation is defined as the study of regulatory phenomena in relation to both preceding and succeeding events, using institution specific and decentralized information to generate feedback effects that support anticipatory rulemaking. 2016
Private rulemakers hold a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because, unlike their public counterparts, they can produce the comparable, decentralized, and institution specific information that rulemaking requires. 2016
The data analysis shows that venture capitalists' finance allocation, and the implicit assessment of innovative products and businesses it embodies, generates highly relevant institution specific and industry specific decentralized information on innovation trends. 2016
The author stipulates that a blockchain is a shared digital ledger or database that maintains a continuously growing list of transactions among participating parties regarding digital assets, described as blocks. 2017
Blockchain removes fraudulent transactions primarily through completely decentralized network connectivity via the Internet, rather than through digital signatures alone, which only establish the identity and authenticity of the parties. 2017
The decentralized, fully distributed nature of the blockchain makes it practically impossible to reverse, alter, or erase information recorded in it. 2017
Smart contracting on the blockchain often makes legal contracting unnecessary because smart contracts emulate the logic of legal contract clauses. 2017
LendingRobot can charge only a 1% management fee and a maximum 0.59% annual fund expense fee because its blockchain secured business model removes the investment adviser, overhead costs, and the legal fees associated with each investor agreement. 2017
Blockchain technology lowers transaction costs by eliminating intermediaries, and it substitutes immutability and cryptography for the trust that intermediaries previously supplied. 2017
Smart contracting on blockchain platforms often makes legal contracting unnecessary, because smart contracts emulate the logic of legal contract clauses. 2017
Business, administrative and legal services that consist of keeping ledgers, such as notary and registry services, legal motions practice, and title companies, are likely to be among the first services eliminated by blockchain adoption. 2017
Blockchain increases competitive pressure in the private investment fund industry because its decentralized model for financial transactions disintermediates and disrupts the existing financial infrastructure. 2017
Jurisdiction over the public blockchain does not exist within the present doctrinal infrastructure for jurisdiction, and in practice the blockchain cannot be regulated or governed because it is decentralized and autonomous. 2017
Enforcement against the blockchain is unlikely to work because it is maintained and owned by a distributed group of anonymous users worldwide who would not likely recognize or comply with any legal authority. 2017
Distributed networks disintermediate: because validation is distributed, a centralized validating entity such as a central bank or clearing house is not necessary to record and validate transactions. 2017
Smart contracting often makes legal contracting unnecessary, because smart contracts frequently emulate the logic of legal contract clauses. 2017
Consistent with market fragmentation and disintermediation, smaller private investment fund managers have begun to erode the power of established market institutions such as banks and insurance companies. 2017
Post crisis regulation that restrained bank lending, particularly to SMEs, opened a new market that private investment funds moved into, accelerating their involvement in banking functions. 2017
Private investment funds that are first movers in implementing blockchain infrastructure in finance directly contribute to disintermediation and accelerate the evolution of blockchain infrastructure in finance. 2017
Whether private investment funds succeed in disintermediating banks through blockchain implementation depends on their ability to find scale opportunities. 2017
Blockchain technology delivers anonymous and secure transactional guarantees through democratized trust and disintermediation, and its anti-discrimination features allow minorities and disenfranchised communities to benefit from the technology. 2017
Because the public blockchain is public and immutable, the technology increases transparency while significantly reducing transaction costs, and intermediaries including lawyers are replaced by code, connectivity, crowd, and collaboration. 2017
Smart contracting often makes legal contracting unnecessary because smart contracts emulate the logic of legal contract clauses. 2017
Even if every user and supporter of the blockchain and their locations were known, it would still not be possible to exercise jurisdiction in the traditional meaning of the word, because the system operates largely autonomously. 2017
A government cannot control a blockchain by pressuring individuals within its territory; it would need complete control of 51 percent of the anonymous global users before it could change any part of the code. 2017
As blockchain use grows, node operation will eventually require special equipment affordable only by large corporations in the existing legal infrastructure, creating the possibility of dangerous centralization and a threat to anonymity. 2017
Because no conceivable way exists to permanently hide an arbiter's reputation from the arbiter in an open system, the corruption risk created by high reputation arbiters becoming valued counselors for disputants is an insoluble problem with the authors' own proposal. 2017
Increased availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking is what makes anticipatory action possible, because such information facilitates rulemakers' predictions and anticipation of otherwise unforeseeable contingencies. 2017
Contingent capital securities optimize information for rulemaking because, when issued and triggered, they produce highly valuable, real time, decentralized information on the financial wellbeing of a given regulated entity. 2017
The occurrence of the debt to equity trigger creates real time regulatory information that a centralized system would require months or years to generate, and it enables regulators to open a regulatory investigation if and when one is needed. 2017
Initial Coin Offerings are the most efficient means of financing entrepreneurial initiatives in the history of capital formation, because they minimize transaction cost and democratize finance while dis-intermediating banks. 2017
The pre-ICO price of a cryptocurrency is set arbitrarily by the start-up team that structured the offering, while post-ICO price dynamics are left to supply and demand determined by the network of participants rather than any central authority. 2017
ICOs filled the void left by constrained bank and non-bank start-up financing and enabled a democratization and inclusion process that facilitated banking disintermediation. 2017
The decentralization of law pursued by Legal Tech startups has broad repercussions for the legal profession, the first of which is that existing legal services are rendered increasingly irrelevant or are replaced outright by Legal Tech. 2017
The counseling, deal making, matchmaking, gatekeeping, and enforcement roles historically performed by lawyers are increasingly performed by technology, and blockchain technology and smart contracting will accelerate that substitution. 2017
Intermediaries, lawyers among them, are replaced by code, connectivity, crowd, and collaboration. 2017
It is the completely decentralized network connectivity of the blockchain via the Internet, more than the use of digital signatures to establish party identity and authenticity, that provides the strongest protection against fraud. 2017
Smart contracting on a blockchain often makes conventional legal contracting unnecessary, because smart contracts emulate the logic of legal contract clauses. 2017
Increased connectivity enabled by blockchain technology, combined with increased decentralization, allows the removal of intermediaries including lawyers, financial intermediaries, and platform companies. 2017
Once blockchain technology gains wider acceptance and its applications reach consumers, existing legal processes and structures will likely be among the first processes to become redundant. 2017
Because a series of smart contracts granted DAO token holders voting rights, the blockchain based smart contracts performed the function of articles of association or corporate bylaws, in an organization that had no directors, managers, or employees. 2017
The traditional legal tool kit worked adequately when innovation cycles were long, but where innovation is exponential it is regularly out of touch with the radically different needs of a decentralized world and often produces disastrous outcomes. 2017
For the parts of dealmaking and other legal tasks that cannot be placed on a blockchain, the role of non blockchainable agents of trust may expand, and blockchain driven disintermediation of law may itself create additional legal tasks requiring human lawyers. 2017
Blockchain's structural characteristic as a decentralized model for financial transactions disintermediates and disrupts the existing financial infrastructure, so private funds that adopt it first directly accelerate that disintermediation. 2017
Algorithms substitute for human middlemen inside firms, and this substitution is what produces flatter, unmediated organizations in which the best idea, rather than hierarchical position, prevails. 2017
Platform disruptors such as Uber and Airbnb did not decentralize their industries by eliminating intermediaries; they decentralized by replacing incumbent intermediaries with algorithmic ones. 2017
Society is moving from a centralized infrastructure to a decentralized, unmediated, and interconnected one, and from vertical hierarchies to horizontal, open, and autonomous networks; this transition, not the short-term versus long-term debate, is the relevant frame for corporate governance. 2017
Blockchain-based smart contracts in digital marketplaces are the technology most likely to extend and lead the decentralization of the relationship between businesses and their counterparties. 2017
Despite the obvious benefits of technology applications in corporate governance, the technological revolution has not yet produced wide acceptance of unmediated or decentralized corporate governance structures and practices. 2017
Even after recent reforms, the corporate governance framework remains framed in terms of hierarchy, which is why it fits poorly with looser and unmediated stakeholder relationships. 2017
Fundamental flaws in the DAO's code allowed hackers to move one third of contributed funds to a subsidiary account, ending that initiative, but the flaws were in the implementation and do not defeat the DAO vision, which developers continue to rebuild. 2017
Reputation value in any decentralized reputational system can be corrupted through three channels: direct purchase of reputation, automated worthless work, and degeneration of the system into a majority of inexpert opinions. 2018
The platform becomes fully autonomous almost immediately after deployment, because once the Ethereum DApp is posted its authors have no more control over the evolution of the expertise tags than any other Ethereum user. 2018
Under certain restrictive assumptions it has been proven that no protocol can guarantee fair exchange with decentralized arbiters, so no design on this architecture can promise absolute certainty of fair machine arbitration. 2018
The architecture is built for a hostile open environment containing malicious anonymous actors, and the authors concede it works even better in a centralized system with identified participants where the blockchain and its inefficiencies are unnecessary. 2018
Decentralized solutions can challenge the basic assumptions of the theory of the firm, because the role of the firm changes if decentralized technology lowers the cost of using markets exponentially. 2018
To date no blockchain coherently and comprehensively combines scale, security, and decentralization, the three objectives of the blockchain trilemma, although continued experimentation with consensus algorithms can help overcome it over time. 2018
Existing centralized micro task marketplaces cannot adequately meet the rising demand for high quality labelled AI training data. 2018
The cost structure of centralized micro task systems, which require intermediation, produces significant overpricing that does not benefit the workers themselves. 2018
To offset human limitations, requesters in centralized micro task structures assign the same task to teams of up to fifteen workers to form a consensus. 2018
Roughly 38 percent of the labor pool is unbanked but skilled, and this group has no access to centralized micro task marketplaces. 2018
A bank account is a necessary condition for participation in the existing centralized micro task marketplace: without one, a worker can neither contribute nor profit. 2018
Signup and approval processes in centralized micro task systems are invasive, privacy challenging, time consuming, and unclear, and they function as market entry barriers for micro task workers. 2018
Decentralized crypto market solutions can significantly optimize the existing mechanical turk market while simultaneously democratizing access to it. 2018
The protocol lowers cost because it removes the manual verification step and the associated multiplication of micro task work that centralized systems require, letting decentralized workers capture the gains from disintermediation. 2018
Existing decentralized gamification attempts for micro task workers fail because they are monodimensional and permit earning only by playing the game, whereas a multidimensional design gives players several ways to earn and builds stronger loyalty. 2018
Centralized mechanical turk marketplace leaders operate as rent seeking intermediaries that generate numerous inefficiencies in the market and deprive freelance workers of a share in the profits the platforms capture. 2018
Centralized industry leaders in the freelancer market, including Upwork, Amazon, and Fiverr, charge up to 40 percent in transaction fees. 2018
Centralized platform fees charged to requesters for the right to submit tasks exert downward pressure on worker compensation, so the fee structure itself is what depresses pay. 2018
Removing centralized fees produces a more efficient marketplace for workers, verifiers, and requesters alike by eliminating rent seeking intermediaries, leaving gas for posters as the only cost. 2018
Poor user interface quality on centralized micro task platforms increases both the time workers need per task and their error rate, and both effects lower worker earning ability. 2018
The FCA has acknowledged that distributed ledger technology has unique aspects capable of working around current regulations. 2018
Because blockchain network nodes verify, validate and audit transactions both before and after execution, the model is safer than a traditional one in which transactions can only be accomplished through third party intermediaries such as a bank, judiciary or notary. 2018
Blockchain replaces intermediaries, bureaucracy and old fashioned procedures with the four Cs of code, connectivity, crowd and collaboration, which increases openness and speed while significantly reducing costs. 2018
Existing blockchains and DAOs still lack genuine decentralization, and there are currently no true DAOs: Bitcoin's proof of work protocol has produced mining pools because of economies of scale and unbalanced reward structures. 2018
In a truly decentralized system any mistake, such as a stolen or lost password or a programming bug, is permanent and irrevocable. 2018
The real design challenge for consensus protocols is to find a proof of stake protocol that offers both trust and security without unintentionally creating just another centralized validation system. 2018
Internet based platform businesses and distributed ledger technology businesses have not reached their full potential, and the core factor holding them back is worldwide decreasing trust in the internet together with under developed trust in decentralized technology solutions. 2018
Digitized and automated trust is not a stable substitute for institutional trust, because it is experiencing crises of its own that undermine the proliferation of value enhancing internet based platform businesses and distributed ledger technology businesses. 2018
The centralized version of the internet cannot scale to the thirty to fifty billion connected devices that experts expect by 2020, which is why decentralized authentication solutions for internet of things devices are needed. 2018
Every centralized reputation score can be sybil attacked, because fake internet accounts or fictitious ratings disrupt true reputation scoring. 2018
Because power exercised over a store of value inevitably produces economies of scale, cryptocurrencies and any other transferable store of value drive networks toward centralization. 2018
Reputation does not push a network toward centralization the way currency does, because reputation must be earned and can be lost yet cannot be turned into a fungible store of value exchangeable for goods. 2018
The fungibility of the staked currency is the main point of attack against proof of stake and leads inevitably to centralization. 2018
Because all fungible fees are already shared in proper proportion among Anchor holders, participants have less reason to join a mining pool, which makes the system more decentralized. 2018
Sockpuppet accounts grow their reputation value much faster than honest users can in a Web of Trust, because sockpuppets validate each other, and the system is therefore flawed and should not be used where fungible currency is at stake. 2018
The combined efficiencies of the DAO model suggest that DAO businesses could overcome collective action problems and outcompete existing internet based businesses such as Uber. 2018
Because all block creation fees are shared with the whole group as a reputation weighted salary, SPoS removes the direct monetary reward for forming mining pools or block production cartels, which the authors identify as a decentralization threat that raises the likelihood of 51% attacks. 2018
Even though proof of stake mitigates the economy of scale advantage, block production cartels can still arise in PoS systems through lotteries, through built in voting delegations, or because the stakes required to be a block producer can simply be bought. 2018
If a blockchain cannot restart or regenerate autonomously after going offline or losing most active nodes, it needs social coordination between nodes; that requirement threatens anonymity and forces reliance on famous nodes. 2018
Any blockchain whose soft forks are decided through private communication between famous token holding whales is ultimately less secure than legacy centralized systems, which at least address centralized security risks deliberately. 2018
If the bench institutes protocols for rejecting applicants through the validation pool, it gains both the incentive and the opportunity to block all new users entirely, so that existing bench members keep sharing all the fees among themselves. 2018
Centralized, hierarchical organizations are defined by three features: a centralized source of authority, a closed formal hierarchy with functionally differentiated roles, and standardized bureaucratic procedures dictated and policed by that hierarchy. 2018
Earlier technological revolutions produced greater organizational centralization, because societies responded to the uncertain meaning, effects, and risks of new technology by pooling authority; the current digital transformation reverses this pattern. 2018
Blockchain extends what the Internet did for information: it makes it possible to transfer and exchange value and assets without traditional centralized intermediaries, by storing information in a decentralized, accessible and secure online environment. 2018
It is the decentralized character of the blockchain, that is the distribution of the ledger to countless nodes in peer-to-peer networks, rather than any other feature, that makes the technology potentially disruptive. 2018
Most current blockchain applications lack complete decentralization: proof of work style validation has produced mining pools because of economies of scale and unbalanced reward structures. 2018
In a truly decentralized system where code is law, any mistake such as a stolen or lost password or a programming bug is permanent and irrevocable, because there is no authority able to reverse it. 2018
Centralized organizations also lose the competition for talent, because the younger generation views centralization as a threat to personal autonomy, choice and happiness and is increasingly sceptical of traditional hierarchies. 2018
Personal happiness, freedom and expression can thrive better in a decentralized world only on the condition that the decentralized world provides a secure environment, which is why blockchain platforms attract people. 2018
Decentralized organization has not yet displaced the centralized world: traditional incumbents still enjoy enormous market power, and the success of more decentralized systems still depends on the goodwill of the parties involved. 2018
The authors argue that the tipping point in experiments with decentralization has already been passed, so rather than affirming the centralized world or remaining trapped between the two realities, it is necessary to become actively involved in developing blockchain and smart contracts. 2018
DAOs are unlikely to disrupt existing corporate structures in the foreseeable future because the blockchain industry is still in its infancy and core decentralized infrastructure elements will remain lacking. 2019
Decentralized systems become more attack resistant and grow quickly because their information flow is optimized through dynamic feedback effects, which lets them mutate and change very easily. 2019
Curators were the core point of centralization in the original 2016 DAO because the smart contract could not on its own distinguish real from fake proposals, leaving curators with approval and vote prioritization power before any community vote. 2019
The complex systems that decentralized infrastructure technology will reform are interdependent, so development of the infrastructure elements alone is not enough: structural and cultural changes in legacy systems must be worked through before the technology can be applied. 2019
Reform of agency relationships in decentralized systems is possible only if and when a truly decentralized public blockchain emerges that is scalable and fully secure; without it, information asymmetries, censorship, agent opportunism, and system corruption may persist. 2019
Facts based, ex post, trial and error rulemaking with stable and presumptively optimal rules is incompatible with the needs of decentralized systems, because knowledge filters in at the edges of such systems and cannot be encapsulated in a timely fashion. 2019
Traditional jurisdictional principles cannot directly apply to blockchain technology because the blockchain is merely a collection of agreed upon calculations by decentralized computer systems, and no particular node holds the entire blockchain. 2019
Reputation based metrics were ineffective in centralized governance systems because before blockchain, reputation could not be stored autonomously, anonymously, and transparently, so it was not a reliable predictor of actors' future actions. 2019
Because direct ownership on a blockchain removes the need for the Depository Trust Corporation to hold the certificate and for a broker to record beneficial ownership, agency costs can be cut and ownership clarity increases. 2019
Transfer agents become unnecessary in blockchain based trading models because every function they perform, including maintaining the holding record, can be automated in code and is already produced by the ledger's design. 2019
As a foundational technology, blockchain technology builds the infrastructure for decentralized networked governance, which over time creates an environment in which the internal and external monitoring mechanisms previously necessitated by agency problems in corporate governance can be removed. 2019
Supervisory tasks traditionally performed by principals to control their agents can be delegated to decentralized computer networks that are reliable, secure, immutable, and independent of fallible human input and discretionary human goodwill. 2019
It is decentralized network connectivity via the Internet, rather than blockchain's use of digital signatures, that provides the most protection against fraud, because multiple copies of the blockchain are available to all participants across the distributed network. 2019
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations have begun to challenge the core belief that governance necessitates agency, because blockchain enables the removal of agents as intermediaries through code, peer-to-peer connectivity, crowds, and collaboration. 2019
The core issues that afflict centralized governance solutions, including information asymmetries, censorship, opportunism of agents, breaches of fiduciary duties, and fraud, can only be truly removed if and when a truly decentralized public blockchain emerges that is scalable and fully secure. 2019
Decentralized systems lack a central intelligence or leadership hierarchy; instead intelligence is distributed through the system and information enters at the edges, closer to where action occurs and where real time information is generated. 2019
Because information flow in decentralized systems is optimized through dynamic feedback effects, such systems mutate and change easily, which makes them more attack resistant and allows them to grow very quickly. 2019
Decentralized commerce is defined as the global exchange of financial instruments, goods, and services via emerging decentralized technologies. 2019
Every time decentralization emerges in a given industry, profit margins disappear, as demonstrated by Skype in telecommunications and by Napster and Emule in the music industry. 2019
Decentralized technologies increase consumer and market trust at unprecedented scale, which lowers transaction costs and raises confidence and certainty, thereby facilitating economies of scale that centralized structures may not be able to achieve. 2019
Because cryptocurrencies embody a transferable store of value, the exercise of power over that value inevitably leads back to centralization through economies of scale, creating core points of attack that undermine the very nature of decentralization. 2019
Because of their disciplining and market stability enhancing effects, stable cryptocurrencies form the backbone of the financial technology infrastructure required for any distributed app economy and decentralized commerce to emerge. 2019
Without something that functions as an insurance policy when commercial risks materialize, the public has no reason to pursue the benefits of decentralized commerce, so decentralized underwriting is of core importance to any future decentralized technology solution. 2019
Democratized decentralized underwriting is more secure and stable than centralized underwriting because diversifying lenders and underwriters adds liquidity in all states of the economy and silos losses so that there is less cascading during economic crises. 2019
Democratized banking is more responsive to regulation than centralized structures because ideas at the edge have greater opportunity to affect policy, unlike the existing global hierarchy in which a single group in Basel provides the dominant voice. 2019
Decentralized banking substitutes blockchain transparency, a permanently uneditable record, and equal access for the governmental fiat that traditionally created public confidence, building slowly toward the higher confidence equilibrium that raises economic efficiency. 2019
The flexibility that human business requires will unlikely ever be attained in existing decentralized protocols unless a decentralized verification system is built into decentralized commerce. 2019
Reputation avoids the recentralization dynamic that afflicts currencies because it must be earned and can be lost yet cannot be converted into a fungible store of value exchangeable for goods. 2019
Without a core common ethical denominator, decentralized systems cannot last: they lose coherence, become attackable, and can be corrupted, leading to suboptimal societal outcomes. 2019
Decentralization is not merely the redistribution of centrally organized authority or revenue, nor the delegation of centralized authority to managers at all organizational levels; the author stipulates these negative boundaries to separate decentralization from centralized reform. 2019
Decentralized systems have no central intelligence or hierarchical leadership; intelligence is instead spread throughout the system, and information filters in at the edges where the action is and where most real time information is created. 2019
Decentralized systems mutate and change easily because their information flow is optimized through dynamic feedback effects, and this capacity to mutate is what makes them more attack resistant on multiple levels. 2019
The five types of decentralization, governmental and regulatory, technological, organizational, market, and societal, are not independent: as one type proliferates it progressively affects the others through feedback effects, producing compounding change. 2019
General Electric's decentralization under Jack Welch worked because each business unit was made fully accountable through its own profit and loss statement and market price internal transactions, which removed inefficiencies and drove up market value. 2019
The disillusionment with political institutions after the 2008 to 2009 financial crisis inaugurated a new form of technological decentralization, of which the 2009 Bitcoin protocol is the leading result, conceived as an alternative to the shortcomings of the financial system. 2019
Legacy businesses' attempts to control decentralized competition by acquiring and integrating decentralized firms into centralized power structures may actually produce the opposite of the intended effect, namely long term incremental proliferation of decentralized solutions. 2019
DAOs are in their infancy and cannot currently overcome core governance problems while maintaining a decentralized structure; the two objectives are, as of 2019, in tension. 2019
Because cryptocurrencies embody a transferable store of value, the exercise of power over that value inevitably leads to centralization through economies of scale, which creates core points of attack and undermines the very nature of decentralization. 2019
Decentralized underwriting is a necessary precondition for decentralized commerce: without something functioning as an insurance policy when commercial risks materialize, the public has no reason to pursue the benefits of decentralized commerce. 2019
Even if legacy insurers do enter the DApp market, their products may not fit the need, because actuarial methods for risk assessment under traditional insurance metrics are only partially compatible with rapidly evolving decentralized products. 2019
The flexibility that human business requires will unlikely ever be attained in existing decentralized protocols unless a decentralized verification system is built into decentralized commerce. 2019
Historical evidence demonstrates that every time decentralization emerges in a given industry, profit margins disappear. 2019
Decentralized commerce is the global exchange of financial instruments, goods and services conducted through decentralized and emerging technologies, a stipulated definition the paper relies on throughout. 2019
Smart contracts make decentralized commerce between anonymous parties possible because they provide automated contracting that self executes and self regulates according to mathematical strictures. 2019
Because the smart contract removes centralized guarantors and self regulates, only limited legal recourse remains available when execution of the contract terms goes wrong. 2019
The flexibility that human business requires will unlikely ever be attained in existing decentralized protocols unless a decentralized verification system is built into decentralized commerce. 2019
Trust barometers such as the Edelman report show a radical depreciation of trust in centralized institutions between 2017 and 2018. 2019
Although smart contracting in decentralized systems is perceived as creating trust through preordained coded coordination without agency problems, decentralized commerce is equally afflicted with trust issues. 2019
Trust between counterparties in decentralized systems can only limitedly be assured by smart contracts, because the contract cannot verify the underlying qualities or future conduct of the parties. 2019
Solving the trust problem in decentralized commerce requires an intangible value system, not a further transferable store of value. 2019
The transferability of the stores of value entailed in cryptocurrencies creates core points of attack and undermines the very nature of decentralization. 2019
Because cryptocurrencies, like any currency or store of value, entail transferable value, the exercise of power over that value inevitably leads to centralization through economies of scale. 2019
Reputation used as a metric and store of value does not lead to centralization because it must be earned, it can be lost, and it cannot be converted into a fungible store of value exchangeable for goods. 2019
Reputation is the key ingredient that enables commerce, and it is precisely the ingredient that makes truly decentralized solutions possible. 2019
Centralized capitalist institutions have been built entirely around centralized and hierarchical reputation systems, which is why replacing them requires a decentralized reputation substitute. 2019
Bitcoin proved that a decentralized system can automate the transfer of valuable digital currency without intermediaries and without a centralized authority for recourse, doing so efficiently, securely, cheaply and expeditiously. 2019
By removing the need for costly back testing, template validation facilitates decentralized business transactions at unprecedented scale. 2019
Insurance underwriting as currently organized imposes significant costs and inefficiencies and erects high barriers to entry, and it provides no democratized access to the underwriting process or collective decision making on risk. 2019
Trust requirements in the DAO are minimized by appropriately designed economic incentives rather than by intermediary reputation or regulation. 2019
Business, administrative, and legal processes that depend on legal intermediaries may become redundant as blockchain technology advances and is accepted, with ledger keeping services such as notary and registry services, motions practice, and title companies among the first to disappear. 2019
Because blockchain is transparent, verifiable, self-authenticating and self-enforcing, transactions can settle instantaneously at near zero cost, and it is this combination plus technology-driven democratized trust that drove the financial industry's large blockchain investments out of fear of obsolescence. 2019
The structural characteristic of blockchain as a decentralized model for financial transactions disintermediates and disrupts the existing financial infrastructure, so funds implementing it are spearheading radical change in financial markets rather than merely adopting a tool. 2019
Significant failure of decentralization projects is not merely tolerable but necessary and useful, because failures are how appropriate use cases get explored during the immature phase of the technology. 2019
JPM Coin's closed structure, restricting the token to existing J.P. Morgan clients, is an anachronism, because closed ecosystems are unsustainable in emerging decentralized commerce. 2019
Monetary policy for stable cryptocurrencies should combine hardcoded transparent rules with protocols enabling decentralized autonomous organizations, with decentralized but fully transparent policy DAOs functioning as the policy makers for what cannot be hardcoded. 2019
The low transaction throughput of public blockchains is a core limitation holding back more advanced distributed applications and, with them, decentralized commerce. 2019
Decentralization technology is unlikely to proliferate without a core use case beyond store of value; banking, money transmission, and triple entry accounting are natural use cases but fall short of being universal use cases for public blockchains. 2019
A decentralized crypto economy requires a stable coin because no rational party will risk wealth on a long term contract denominated in a volatile currency: neither renter nor landlord will sign a lease whose rent may halve or double in any given week. 2019
A currency that does not hold a stable store of value forces continual recalculation and renegotiation of contracts, so any future decentralized economy will require stable cryptocurrencies. 2019
In a blockchain cryptocurrency, transaction taxes should be set to match the cost of running the network, meaning the cost of incentivizing enough nodes for the desired level of decentralization plus the cost of maintaining the coin's stability. 2019
Parameter and policy choices for a stable cryptocurrency should be made by a decentralized autonomous organization, the Stability DAO or SDAO, which functions as a transparent, decentralized, open analog of the US Federal Reserve. 2019
Centralized hierarchies and decentralized flat organizations fail in opposite ways: hierarchies filter out information signals at the edge, while flat organizations amplify edge noise so important information never finds a champion to drive action. 2019
Commonly held expressions of organizational values are essential to designing and implementing any governance structure and are far more important in decentralized organizations, which inherently have less motivational structure than centralized hierarchies. 2019
Centralized coordination of behavior for the common good risks undermining individual effort, whereas blockchain technology's autonomous and anonymous decentralized coordination of individual action can deliver common good outcomes without suppressing individualism and its welfare enhancing effects. 2020
Blockchain technology incentivizes direct transactions between creator and consumer, including compensation, which eliminates the need for intermediation. 2020
Power in a blockchain system is exercised through the consensus protocol, which places control of data with multiple networked parties and thereby creates checks and balances that prevent any single vested interest from controlling the system. 2020
Decentralization is the antidote to the failures of both socialism and capitalism: centralized coordination of societal and economic activity, in whichever ideological form, should be held to a minimum in order to free human potential and improve society. 2020