kaal:claim:2267560-032

Information exchange between agents of public rulemakers, such as regulators, will not necessarily involve decentralized information, unlike feedback effects between private and public rulemakers.

Unlike the feedback effects between private and public rulemakers, the information exchange between agents of public rulemakers, such as regulators, will not necessarily involve decentralized information.

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013), III.2 Private vs. Public Rulemaking, p. 10
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

conditionsupport: argueddecentralizationinstitutional-designlaw-and-legal-systems

• extended_by kaal:claim:2740477-031 Private rulemakers hold a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because, unlike their public counterpar...
• extended_by kaal:claim:2808132-031 Unrestricted exchange of information between public and private rulemakers creates regulatory synergies that i...
• extended_by kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-011 Private rulemakers hold a comparative informational advantage over public rulemakers because they can produce ...

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