kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-011

Private rulemakers hold a comparative informational advantage over public rulemakers because they can produce and react to necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution specific information that public rulemakers cannot readily obtain.

Private rule- makers often have a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because, unlike their public counterparts, they often can produce necessary, compara- ble, decentralized, and institution-specific information for rulemaking.

Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014), II.2 Feedback Effects, p. 13
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Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

mechanismsupport: argueddynamic-regulationdecentralization

• restated_by kaal:claim:2831040-035 Private rulemakers hold a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because they often can produce and acce...
• restated_by kaal:claim:2740477-031 Private rulemakers hold a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because, unlike their public counterpar...
• restates kaal:claim:2267560-027 Private rulemakers can work with and utilize decentralized information continuously, which enables them to rea...
• restates kaal:claim:2267560-018 Private rulemakers have a comparative advantage over public rulemakers in the dynamic regulation framework bec...
• extends kaal:claim:2267560-025 Public rulemakers rely on stable and presumptively optimal rules because they lack necessary, comparable, dece...
• extends kaal:claim:2267560-032 Information exchange between agents of public rulemakers, such as regulators, will not necessarily involve dec...

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