kaal:claim:2831040-035

Private rulemakers hold a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because they often can produce and access necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution specific information for rulemaking and can react more readily to emerging information.

Private rulemakers can have a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because, unlike their public counterparts, they often can produce necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution-specific information for rulemaking.

Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016), IV.2 Optimizing Anticipatory Governance (footnote 7), p. 20
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040

mechanismsupport: argueddynamic-regulationdecentralization

• restates kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-011 Private rulemakers hold a comparative informational advantage over public rulemakers because they can produce ...
• restates kaal:claim:2740477-031 Private rulemakers hold a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because, unlike their public counterpar...
• restates kaal:claim:2267560-018 Private rulemakers have a comparative advantage over public rulemakers in the dynamic regulation framework bec...
• restates kaal:claim:2267560-027 Private rulemakers can work with and utilize decentralized information continuously, which enables them to rea...
• extends kaal:claim:2267560-025 Public rulemakers rely on stable and presumptively optimal rules because they lack necessary, comparable, dece...

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