kaal:claim:2267560-025
Public rulemakers rely on stable and presumptively optimal rules because they lack necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution-specific information.
Source quote, verbatim
Public rulemakers rely on stable and presumptively optimal rules because they lack necessary, comparable, de-centralized, and institution-specific information.
From
Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013), III.2 Private vs. Public Rulemaking, p. 9
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 · source PDF
Cite as
Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
Classification
mechanismsupport: arguedfailure: public rulemaker information deficitfamily: information-asymmetrydynamic-regulationdecentralization
Related claims
Verify
The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/cd103fa7289bc13f...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-025.md | sha256sum