kaal:claim:2740477-031

Private rulemakers hold a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because, unlike their public counterparts, they can produce the comparable, decentralized, and institution specific information that rulemaking requires.

Source quote, verbatim
Private rulemakers can have a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because, unlike their public counterparts, they often can produce necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution-specific information for rulemaking.
From

Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016), V. Dynamic Regulation as a Regulatory Supplement, p. 25
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477

Classification

mechanismsupport: argueddynamic-regulationdecentralizationinstitutional-design

Related claims
Verify

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/5f8bd731374d21dc...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-031.md | sha256sum