kaal:claim:3441904-015

Curators were the core point of centralization in the original 2016 DAO because the smart contract could not on its own distinguish real from fake proposals, leaving curators with approval and vote prioritization power before any community vote.

Source quote, verbatim
Because the smart contract on its own could not distinguish real from fake proposals, the curators had approval power and vote prioritization power over contractor proposals before the proposals were put up to a DAO community vote.
From

Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019), III.1 Centralized Design Elements in the Original 2016 DAO, p. 14
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

Holds when
Classification

mechanismsupport: evidencedfailure: curator-bottleneckfamily: recentralization-driftdecentralizationdaogovernance-design

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