kaal:claim:3125827-028

When a fork skips valid blocks, fees previously distributed to the bench from those blocks lose their valid histories and ownership reverts to the transaction authors, which creates a direct disincentive for validators to endorse such forks.

skipped blocks will no longer have valid histories in those skipped blocks, and so the fees' ownership will automatically revert to the authors of the transactions contained in the skipped blocks. This creates a disincentive for validating such forks.

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018), 5.2 Block production, p. 19
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827 · source PDF

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827

• a producer points to a block earlier than the previous time slot
• skipped blocks become orphans

mechanismsupport: arguedconsensus-and-securityrisk-and-incentives

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