kaal:claim:3125827-037

Under the worst case model with no admission safeguards and no other users paying fees, a malicious group must invest at minimum twice the total sem tokens of the system to reach 50% voting power in the validation pool, because half of every fee it pays mints tokens for the existing good faith experts.

Consequently the malicious group would need to invest an absolute minimum of 2g8 , that is, double the total sem tokens of the system to gain 50% power in the system in order to outvote the rest of the good-faith experts in the validation pool.

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018), A.1 The price to purchase 51% of the sem tokens, p. 31
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827 · source PDF

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827

• no safeguards on joining as an expert
• no other users adding fees
• continuous micro payment strategy, which is the attacker's optimum

empiricalsupport: evidencedconsensus-and-securitytokenomics

• supports kaal:claim:3125822-022 If good faith experts counter invest at least as fast as the malicious group, that is at a constant fraction c...
• extends kaal:claim:3125822-019 In the absolute worst case, with no safeguards at all, the price of corrupting the platform from within is a m...

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 598d9bd95e4af7a0a35328677c6bfc069f69f2e32c30c720b3a0be98a23a40cb. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/42f60aa1963047c2...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-037.md | sha256sum