kaal:claim:3227967-006

In early Silicon Valley the contractual mechanisms lawyers designed, together with the lawyer dominated market for reputation, reduced information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors and were necessary to bring the demand and supply sides of venture capital together effectively.

Finally, the contractual mechanisms and the lawyer-dominated market for reputation reduced the information asymmetries between the entrepreneurs and investors and, as such, were necessary to bring the demand-side and supply-side of "venture capital" together effectively.

Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in a Digital Age Why 'Coding for Lawyers' Matters (2018), III. Lawyers as Transaction Engineers, p. 11
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227967 · source PDF

Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in a Digital Age Why 'Coding for Lawyers' Matters (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227967

• venture capital markets with young and inexperienced entrepreneurs
• Silicon Valley from the early 1970s

mechanismsupport: evidencedinnovationdisclosuresecurities-law

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