In early Silicon Valley the contractual mechanisms lawyers designed, together with the lawyer dominated market for reputation, reduced information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors and were necessary to bring the demand and supply sides of venture capital together effectively.
Source quote, verbatim
Finally, the contractual mechanisms and the lawyer-dominated market for reputation reduced the information asymmetries between the entrepreneurs and investors and, as such, were necessary to bring the demand-side and supply-side of "venture capital" together effectively.
From
Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in a Digital Age Why 'Coding for Lawyers' Matters (2018), III. Lawyers as Transaction Engineers, p. 11 https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227967 · source PDF
Cite as
Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in a Digital Age Why 'Coding for Lawyers' Matters (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227967
Holds when
venture capital markets with young and inexperienced entrepreneurs
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