kaal:claim:3266953-035

The Sockpuppet Protocol breaks the incentive for Sybil attacks because all power derives from validation pools in relation to what members stake and all fungible currency rewards are shared with the group in proportion to individual reputation.

Source quote, verbatim

All power comes from validation pools in relation to what DAO members stake, and all fungible currency rewards are shared fairly with the group in proportion to their individual reputation. The Sockpuppet Protocol thus breaks the incentives for Sybil attacks.

From

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper (2018), Sockpuppet Protocol, p. 22
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266953 · source PDF

Cite as

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266953

Holds when

reward changes occur only through validation pools

Classification

mechanismsupport: arguedconsensus-and-security

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