kaal:claim:3373393-003

The core agency conflicts that emanate from the separation of ownership by shareholder principals and control by manager agents cannot be fully addressed by the existing theoretical and legal framework, because monitoring agents is inevitably costly and transaction costs abound.

Source quote, verbatim

However, the core agency conflicts emanating from the separation of ownership (shareholder principal) and control (manager agent) cannot be fully addressed by the existing theoretical and legal framework.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019), I. Introduction, p. 3
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393

Holds when

under the existing theoretical and legal framework for corporate governance

Classification

failuresupport: arguedfailure: irreducible-agency-conflictfamily: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunismcompliancegovernance-designcorporate-governance

Related claims

restated_by kaal:claim:3808852-010 Agency theory and the existing legal framework have failed to resolve the core agency conflict arising from th...

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