kaal:claim:3405401-024

Reputation used as a metric and store of value does not lead to centralization because it must be earned, it can be lost, and it cannot be converted into a fungible store of value exchangeable for goods.

Reputation as a metric and store of value does not suffer the same consequences and does not lead to centralization because it must be earned, it can be lost, yet it cannot be turned into a fungible store of value that allows the exchange for goods etc.

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed (2019), VI. Decentralized Reputation as the Solution, p. 7
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405401 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Commerce – A Primer on Why Decentralized Reputation Verification Systems Are Needed (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405401

• reputation is non fungible and non transferable

mechanismsupport: arguedreputationdecentralizationrisk-and-incentives

• restates kaal:claim:3266953-013 Reputation does not push a network toward centralization the way currency does, because reputation must be ear...
• restated_by kaal:claim:3406323-035 Reputation avoids the recentralization dynamic that afflicts currencies because it must be earned and can be l...

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