The identity of actors in a DAO governance design typically creates corruptive elements, and merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.
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Similarly, the identity of actors in a DAO governance design creates typically corruptive elements. Merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.
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Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020), III.3 Suboptimal Incentive Design, p. 30 https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481 · source PDF
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Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481
restated_bykaal:claim:3799320-015 The identity of actors in a DAO governance design is itself a source of corruption, so merit identifiers other...
extended_bykaal:claim:3808873-038 When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rat...
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