kaal:claim:3652481-021

The identity of actors in a DAO governance design typically creates corruptive elements, and merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.

Similarly, the identity of actors in a DAO governance design creates typically corruptive elements. Merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020), III.3 Suboptimal Incentive Design, p. 30
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

mechanismsupport: arguedfailure: identity based corruptionfamily: fraud-and-misconductgovernance-design

• restated_by kaal:claim:3799320-015 The identity of actors in a DAO governance design is itself a source of corruption, so merit identifiers other...
• extended_by kaal:claim:3808873-038 When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rat...

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