kaal:claim:3808873-038

When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt the governance design for their own gain; merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.

Source quote, verbatim
When fungible assets are used as the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal constituents and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt the governance design of the DAO for their own gain.
From

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021), XI. Lack of Decentralized Governance Systems, p. 31
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873

Holds when
Classification

mechanismsupport: arguedfailure: Fungible Asset Governance Corruptionfamily: plutocratic-capturedaogovernance-design

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