kaal:claim:3441904-018

Participants must be incentivized to improve their own utility while simultaneously benefiting the institution over the long run; without that duality of incentivization, rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents will attempt to game the governance design.

Without that duality of incentivization, rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents will attempt to game the governance design.

Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019), III.2 Lack of Proper Incentivization, p. 16
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

• all blockchain governance structures, especially on chain governance

conditionsupport: arguedfailure: single-sided-incentivesfamily: staking-and-incentive-misalignmentai-and-agentsrisk-and-incentivesgovernance-designregulatory-failuredao

• restated_by kaal:claim:3652481-019 Overcoming attempts by rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game a DAO's governanc...
• restated_by kaal:claim:3808873-037 Effective institutional governance, human or machine, requires a duality of incentives in which actors improve...
• restated_by kaal:claim:3799320-013 Effective institutional governance requires a duality of incentives, namely incentives for actors to improve t...
• generalizes kaal:claim:3799320-014 When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of a DAO with identifiable actors, ra...
• generalizes kaal:claim:3808873-038 When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rat...

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