kaal:claim:3799320-014

When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of a DAO with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt that governance design for their own gain.

When fungible assets are used as the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rational and opportunistic internal constituents and external participants will typically attempt to corrupt the governance design of the DAO for their own gain.

Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021), Suboptimal Incentive Design, p. 11
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320

• fungible assets used as the dominant governance incentive
• actors who are identifiable

failuresupport: arguedfailure: Fungible governance capturefamily: plutocratic-capturetokenomicsgovernance-designregulatory-failurerisk-and-incentives

• extended_by kaal:claim:3808873-038 When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rat...
• specializes kaal:claim:3441904-018 Participants must be incentivized to improve their own utility while simultaneously benefiting the institution...
• extended_by kaal:claim:4067783-005 Governance by fungible tokens lets whales control a fundraiser DAO, which is antithetical to decentralized gov...
• specializes kaal:claim:3652481-019 Overcoming attempts by rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game a DAO's governanc...

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