kaal:claim:3652481-019

Overcoming attempts by rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game a DAO's governance design requires a duality of incentives, in which actors improve their own utility while their actions simultaneously benefit the whole institution over the long run.

Human nature and any effective machine derivates of human engagements in institutional form require a duality of incentives in order to overcome attempts of rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game the governance design of a given DAO.

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020), III.3 Suboptimal Incentive Design, p. 29
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

conditionsupport: arguedrisk-and-incentivesregulatory-failuredaogovernance-design

• extended_by kaal:claim:3808873-037 Effective institutional governance, human or machine, requires a duality of incentives in which actors improve...
• extended_by kaal:claim:3799320-013 Effective institutional governance requires a duality of incentives, namely incentives for actors to improve t...
• restates kaal:claim:3441904-018 Participants must be incentivized to improve their own utility while simultaneously benefiting the institution...
• generalizes kaal:claim:3799320-014 When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of a DAO with identifiable actors, ra...

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