kaal:claim:3782198-003

The social media coordination function remains largely flawed and corruptible because the incentive design underlying social proof is suboptimal.

However, because the incentive design for social proof is suboptimal, the social media coordination function is still largely flawed and corruptible.

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021), From Social Media to Decentralized Coordination, p. 5
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198 · source PDF

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198

• applies to platform ratings, reviews, and social proof mechanisms under centralized ownership

failuresupport: arguedfailure: corruptible-social-prooffamily: reputation-system-gamingrisk-and-incentivesinstitutional-design

• extended_by kaal:claim:3808859-008 The social media coordination function is still largely flawed because the incentive design underlying social ...

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