kaal:claim:3782201-017

Human middlemen have an incentive not to entirely eliminate the corruption they are paid to overcome, which is one reason they become falsely identified with the friction itself.

These middlemen are paid to overcome these corruptions and frictions. Unfortunately, they have an incentive to not entirely eliminate the corrup- tion.

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021), The fallacy of Uniformitarianism and Chesterton’s fence, p. 21
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201 · source PDF

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201

failuresupport: arguedfailure: intermediary perverse incentivefamily: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunismrisk-and-incentivesinstitutional-design

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