kaal:claim:3782203-012

Given a process with static rules and finite, discrete execution, a sufficiently patient and clever minority can always corrupt the process and profit at the majority's expense while following the rules, so no perfect voting system exists.

Source quote, verbatim
A sufficiently patient and clever minority power can always corrupt the process and profit at the expense of the majority, assuming your process has static rules and finite, discrete execution. There is no perfect voting system.
From

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021), Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, p. 8
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203 · source PDF

Cite as

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203

Holds when
Classification

failuresupport: evidencedfailure: strategic-manipulation-of-static-rulesfamily: rule-obsolescence-and-ossificationgovernance-designregulatory-failure

Related claims
Verify

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is ab8a22d0dbb026a09212a4c85963f3c05787cf80775e8613ae3724e3883e7a56. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/3b9b759d3ac5bd4a...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-012.md | sha256sum