kaal:claim:3782203-016

The efficiency gain from cooperation in repeated games can only be achieved if a policeable reputation system exists: players must have histories and those histories must be available to other players, which makes transparency and communication essential to effective policing.

This new leap in efficiency as the players cooperate can only be achieved if there is the possibility of creating a policeable reputational system. The players must have a history, and that history must be available to the other players.

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021), Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, p. 12
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203 · source PDF

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203

• repeated games
• grim trigger or similar punishment strategies

conditionsupport: arguedreputationdisclosure

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