kaal:claim:3782210-024

In hierarchical structures where members are siloed and have few formal connections across tiers, letting service providers create the regulations produces moral hazard, because the provider has an incentive to weaken standards and regulations.

Source quote, verbatim
In a hierarchical structure, where members are siloed and have few formal connections with those immediately above and below their tier in the hierarchy, this leads to the moral hazard problem that the service pro- vider has an incentive to weaken the standards and regulations.
From

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021), Consequences of the architecture, p. 9
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210 · source PDF

Cite as

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210

Holds when
Classification

failuresupport: arguedfailure: Self-regulation moral hazardfamily: regulatory-capture-and-incumbent-advantagerisk-and-incentivesinstitutional-designregulatory-failure

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