failure family

regulatory capture and incumbent advantage

18 claims across 13 works.

• reform entrenches incumbents: The Dodd-Frank Act is notable for what it omits: it does not break up the largest banks, does little to help smaller and regional banks compete, and b
• regulatory abdication to private interpretation: The SEC never actually interpreted Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley and instead merely acquiesced in a law firm memorandum interpreting the provision, so
• special interest dominance in rulemaking: A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking: smaller and better organized special interest groups usually dominate latent groups such as d
• Incumbent weaponization of rulemaking: Incumbent firms facing a perceived threat from disruptive innovation may respond by using the existing regulatory process itself to create obstacles t
• Incumbent weaponization of the regulatory process: Incumbent firms facing the competitive disadvantage created by disruptive entrants respond by using the existing regulatory process itself to build ob
• incumbent distortion of fact selection: The identification of which facts count as relevant or irrelevant can be distorted by the concerns of entrenched interests that find the new technolog
• rule capture through fact selection: In the Airbnb case, the selection of the relevant facts and the residency rule that followed from it benefit vested interests, most obviously the hote
• regulatory blind spot in private standard setting: Regulating centralized technology conglomerates addresses only part of the problem, because even fully regulated conglomerates retain the power to set
• incumbent-appropriation-of-open-code: The success of the open source movement itself creates a vulnerability: major corporations can pressure smaller projects to reveal their code, then ta
• cartel capture of quality controls: Cartel power undermines attempts by other industry players to create internal or external controls on the quality of code reviews, leaving the public
• Self-regulation moral hazard: In hierarchical structures where members are siloed and have few formal connections across tiers, letting service providers create the regulations pro
• sunset-rent-extraction: Sunset provisions likely increase rents extracted by interest groups and entrench current majoritarian preferences, and they can create planning probl
• renewal-window-capture: Because renewal deadlines create recurring windows for legislative action, sunset clauses become instruments of political maneuvering in which lawmake
• premature-agency-termination: Sunset provisions endanger politically contentious institutions rather than ineffective ones, because agencies that face opposition or controversy can
• committee-driven-incumbent-capture: Private codifications such as the Uniform Commercial Code and INCOTERMS remain static texts that can be amended only through protracted, committee-dri
• funding-capture-of-standard-setters: Existing rulemaking bodies are financially compromised at the source: legislatures depend on taxation or political patronage, and private standard-set
• Capture Relocates To Configuration Control: Giving the agent the trigger relocates the capture problem rather than removing it: where the deployer sets the agent's configuration, capture moves f
• Direct Standing Defeated By Configuration Control: Direct standing fails completely against a judgment-proof deployer that can alter its agent cheaply and undetected, failing as surely as a bribable gu