A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking: smaller and better organized special interest groups usually dominate latent groups such as dispersed investors in the competition to shape rules.
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A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking. In the competition to shape rulemaking, smaller and better organized special interest groups usually dominate latent groups (such as dispersed investors) (Olson 1965).
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Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013), IV.1 Optimizing the Learning Process, p. 11 https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 · source PDF
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Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560
extended_bykaal:claim:2740477-028 Adaptive rulemaking reduces the collective action problem because with fewer stable rules, latent majority gro...
extended_bykaal:claim:2808132-029 Adaptive rulemaking helps overcome the collective action problem of rulemaking because when there are fewer st...
extended_bykaal:claim:2808132-034 A core problem for most regulation is its inaccurate and delayed timing, which follows from the collective act...
extended_bykaal:claim:2808132-028 The collective action problem of rulemaking, the problems of trial-and-error rulemaking, and the problems of r...
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