kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-017

The inadaptability of stable and presumptively optimal rules intensifies competition between well organized special interest groups and latent groups, because inadaptable outcomes raise the stakes for both.

The inadaptability of rules and the stable and presumptively optimal rulemak- ing in the current regulatory framework may intensify the competition be- tween the two groups because it increases the stakes for both interest groups.

Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014), II.4 Supplementing the Regulatory Framework, p. 17
· source PDF

Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

• rules are assumed to be stable and not easily adaptable

mechanismsupport: arguedinstitutional-designeconomics

• extends kaal:claim:2273857-021 In the competition to shape financial policy through rulemaking, small and well organized special interest gro...
• extends kaal:claim:2267560-037 A classic collective action problem controls rulemaking: smaller and better organized special interest groups ...

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 7320aec036ccf2f6739f0854ea8749903e8902e77c2ec39543b64b358459c408. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/c9eee58b89084567...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-017.md | sha256sum