kaal:claim:2808132-028

The collective action problem of rulemaking, the problems of trial-and-error rulemaking, and the problems of regulatory cycles derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules themselves, not from unrelated institutional defects.

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problems associated with trial-and-error rulemaking, and problems associated with regulatory cycles derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules.108 Rulemaking with dynamic elements increases the use of institution-specific,
From

Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016), IV. Dynamic Regulation as a Regulatory Supplement, p. 23
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132 · source PDF

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Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts to Data (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808132

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mechanismsupport: arguedfailure: Stable rules as root causefamily: rule-obsolescence-and-ossificationinstitutional-designdynamic-regulation

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