kaal:claim:2740477-027

The collective action problem of rulemaking, the problems of trial and error rulemaking, and regulatory cycles all derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules rather than from independent causes.

Source quote, verbatim

The collective action problem of rulemaking, problems associated with trial-and-error rulemaking, and problems associated with regulatory cycles derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016), V. Dynamic Regulation as a Regulatory Supplement, p. 24
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477

Classification

mechanismsupport: arguedinstitutional-design

Related claims

restated_by kaal:claim:2808132-028 The collective action problem of rulemaking, the problems of trial-and-error rulemaking, and the problems of r...
extends kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-008 Because rulemaking is subject to regulatory cycles and to a classic collective action problem, rules are gener...

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