kaal:claim:3782214-026

The alternatives to a reputational system for countering profit driven instability, namely external stabilizing forces such as governmental fiat and rapidly expanding profit opportunities, are inadequate because expansion driven stability lasts only as long as the expansion does.

Alternatives to reputational systems for countering the instability generated by profit competition include external stabilizing forces (such as governmental fiat) or rapidly expanding profit opportunities (which will only stabilize a group until the ex- pansion stops).

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021), Reputation counters instability from profit motive, p. 12
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214 · source PDF

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214

• organizations destabilized by profit competition

failuresupport: arguedfailure: expansion dependent stabilityfamily: staking-and-incentive-misalignmentreputationgovernance-design

• supports kaal:claim:3782193-007 The unstoppable power of decentralization is threatened by unregulated competition for profits, but it can be ...
• extends kaal:claim:3782193-028 Almost every blockchain project the authors are aware of is suffering under the centralizing force of competit...

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