kaal:claim:3808859-021

An optimally incentivized democratic decision-making tool would make separation movements in open source less likely, because voters who know the process rewards truth-seeking are more likely to accept an adverse outcome; emerging decentralization technology makes such a tool theoretically feasible.

Perhaps if the open source movement had an optimally incentivized democratic decision-making tool, such separation of interests and development would become less likely.

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021), IV.4 Shortcomings, p. 33
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization – Why We Need Technology Infrastructure Upgrades (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808859

• conditional on incentive-optimal voting mechanisms being buildable

designsupport: speculativegovernance-designrisk-and-incentivesopen-source-and-code

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