kaal:claim:3962614-010

Significant information asymmetries in venture capital can lead portfolio company managers to engage in opportunistic behavior after an investment is made.

Source quote, verbatim

Finally, significant information asymmetries can lead managers to engage in opportunistic behavior after an investment is made.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021), II.1.c) Cost of Deal Screening and Structuring, p. 9
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614

Holds when

post investment stage of a VC financing

Classification

mechanismsupport: evidencedfailure: Post investment managerial opportunismfamily: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunismdisclosurecorporate-governanceinnovation

Related claims

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