kaal:claim:3962614-010

Significant information asymmetries in venture capital can lead portfolio company managers to engage in opportunistic behavior after an investment is made.

Finally, significant information asymmetries can lead managers to engage in opportunistic behavior after an investment is made.

Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021), II.1.c) Cost of Deal Screening and Structuring, p. 9
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614

• post investment stage of a VC financing

mechanismsupport: evidencedfailure: Post investment managerial opportunismfamily: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunismdisclosurecorporate-governanceinnovation

• specializes kaal:claim:3373393-007 Agency problems originate from the lack of trust between principals and agents, which itself stems from inform...

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• Agreement: AI and corporate responsibility – From fragmented compliance to unified governance
• Qualification: THE EFFECT OF DYNAMIC GOVERNANCE ON PUBLIC SERVICE INNOVATION THROUGH THE RECRUITMENT OF MANAGERS OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS